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FIRST AMENDMENT-STUDENT SPEECH-
WHY BELL TOLLS A REVIEW OF
TINKER'S APPLICATION TO OFF-CAMPUS
ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH
Katherine E. Geddes*
HILE the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech," the U.S.
Supreme Court has explained that this right to free speech is
not absolute, especially in an educational setting.' But the reach of the
educational setting remains in dispute-especially with the advent of the
Internet-forcing courts to determine whether off-campus online student
speech may be regulated. 2 In the Fifth Circuit's most recent struggle with
this issue, the en banc majority followed some of its sister circuits by ap-
plying the Tinker test to off-campus online student speech, but also cre-
ated an exception for threatening, harassing, or intimidating student
speech intentionally directed at a school community. 3 This Note argues
that while valid policy justifications underlie the majority's reasoning, the
court missed an opportunity to clarify the law for off-campus online stu-
dent speech by misapplying Tinker and creating a vague exception that
neglects to give students or schools a better understanding of when off-
campus student speech can be regulated without violating students'
rights.
On January 5, 2011, Taylor Bell, also known as "T-Bizzle," posted a rap
song with violent language to his online public Facebook account. 4 The
song alleged that two coaches had sexually harassed female students at
Itawamba Agricultural High School, where Bell was a senior.5 Bell wrote,
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2017; B.A., cum laude, Washington
and Lee University, 2011. Many thanks to my family and friends for their continued love
and support.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969).
2. See cases cited infra note 28.
3. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (holding that student speech must "materially disrupt[]
classwork or involve[ ] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others" to warrant
regulation); Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd. (Bell 11), 799 F.3d 379, 393-96 (5th Cir. 2015)
(en banc), rev'g Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd. (Bell 1), 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014),
petition for cert. filed, No. 15-666 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2015).
4. Bell I, 799 F.3d at 383-85.
5. Bell 1, 774 F.3d at 283.
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recorded, and uploaded the song away from campus and during non-
school hours.6 Instead of garnering the attention of a record label as Bell
had hoped, the song drew the scrutiny of school officials. 7 The day after
Bell uploaded the song online, one of the coaches heard about it and
asked a student to play the song at school.8 That coach reported the song
to the principal, who informed the school-district's superintendent; both
interviewed Bell about his song's allegations the next day and sent him
home early.9 Bell did not return to school for a week because school was
cancelled due to inclement weather, and during that time he posted a
final version of his rap to YouTube. 10 When school reopened, the assis-
tant principal removed Bell from class and told him he was suspended,
pending a disciplinary committee hearing."
During Bell's disciplinary hearing, he testified that he did not report his
complaints to school administrators because he thought they would ig-
nore them and that he uploaded the song to help others understand the
situation and his message.1 2 Bell also stated that he never meant to
threaten, harass, or intimidate the coaches, but that the song alluded to
the potential for someone related to the female students to react violently
to the harassment allegations. 13 Lastly, Bell told the committee that he
posted the song online because he knew others, specifically students,
would likely listen to it since most students had Facebook.' 4 The discipli-
nary committee found that Bell's song harassed and intimidated the two
coaches and upheld Bell's suspension.1 5 Bell appealed the disciplinary
committee's ruling to the school board, but it unanimously found that
Bell's speech not only harassed and intimidate the coaches, but also
threatened them.16
Bell and his mother sued the Itawamba County School Board in the
Northern District of Mississippi claiming that the board had violated
Bell's First Amendment rights. 17 After the court ruled Bell's request for a
preliminary injunction moot, both sides filed motions for summary judg-
ment. 18 In March 2012, the court granted the school's motion for sum-
mary judgment and denied Bell's.19 Bell appealed to the Fifth Circuit,
and in December 2014, a divided panel reversed.20 In February 2015, the
6. Id.
7. See Bell H, 799 F.3d at 383; Bell 1, 774 F.3d at 286.




12. Id. at 385-86; Bell I, 774 F.3d at 286.
13. Bell 1, 774 F.3d at 287.
14. Bell 11, 799 F.3d at 393-96.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 387.
17. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
18. Bell I, 799 F.3d at 388.
19. Id. at 388-89.
20. Bell 1, 774 F.3d at 282.
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court granted the petition for rehearing en banc.21
In its en banc opinion, the Fifth Circuit reversed its prior judgment and
found that Tinker applied to Bell's off-campus online speech and that no
genuine issue of material fact precluded summary judgment for the
school board.22 The court concluded that the school could have forecast a
substantial disruption as a matter of law because a school official could
have reasonably found that Bell's song threatened, harassed, and intimi-
dated the coaches.23 Reviewing the case de novo, the majority began its
discussion with Tinker, which established the general rule governing stu-
dent speech: students can only be disciplined for speech at school that
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others."'24 Next the court reviewed precedent, both the
Supreme Court's and its own, that permitted schools to punish students
for speech that did not satisfy Tinker.25 However, the majority deter-
mined that none of those exceptions applied to the song.26 Rejecting
Bell's argument that Tinker did not apply to off-campus speech, the ma-
jority emphasized that its own precedent from 1972 brought off-campus
speech under Tinker.27 In addition, the court cited sister circuits that held
Tinker applied to off-campus speech.28 Lastly, the majority argued that
the Internet blurred any distinction between on-campus and off-campus
speech, reinforcing its Tinker application. 29
Once the court established that Tinker applied to Bell's speech, the
majority focused on which circumstances could lead to regulation of a
student's off-campus speech under Tinker.30 Again relying on its own
precedent, the court stressed the importance of intent in the Tinker in-
quiry for off-campus speech.31 Because Bell knew students would listen
21. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 782 F.3d. 712, 712 (5th Cir. 2015) (granting
rehearing).
22. Bell 11, 799 F.3d at 391.
23. Id.
24. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); Bell i, 799
F.3d at 389.
25. Bell I, 799 F.3d at 389-92; see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (hold-
ing that schools may regulate student speech that promotes illegal activity during a school-
sponsored event); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988) (ex-
plaining that schools retain greater authority to control student expression that is "dissemi-
nated under its auspices" or might bear its imprimatur); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (establishing that students could be disciplined for "lewd, indecent
or offensive speech" even when the speech did not satisfy Tinker); Ponce v. Socorro Indep.
Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771-72 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that speech that threatens certain
school violence is unprotected).
26. Bell II, 799 F.3d at 391-92.
27. Id. at 393-94; Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 (5th Cir. 1972).
28. Bell II, 799 F.3d at 394; see Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069
(9th Cir. 2013); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee's Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F. 3d 771, 773-76
(8th Cir. 2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs. 652 F.3d 565, 571-73 (4th Cir. 2011); Don-
inger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50-52 (2d Cir. 2008). But see J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011).
29. See Bell 11, 799 F.3d at 396.
30. Id. at 394.




to his rap if he posted it online, the majority determined that he inten-
tionally targeted the school with his speech.3 2 The court next identified
the type of speech that could warrant discipline if intentionally directed at
a school community: language that a layperson would understand threat-
ens, harasses, or intimidates a teacher.33 Thus, the court's holding was
twofold. First, Tinker applies to off-campus online student speech.34 Sec-
ond, an exception to First Amendment protection applies when a student
intentionally targets a school community with speech a layperson would
believe threatened, harassed, or intimidated a school official, even if
"such speech originated, and was disseminated, off-campus. '3 5 However,
the majority declined to apply a "rigid standard" and expressly refused
"to adopt or reject approaches advocated by other circuits. '36
After determining that Tinker applied to Bell's speech, the court's in-
quiry focused on whether his rap caused a disruption or whether school
officials could have reasonably forecast a disruption.37 Giving much def-
erence to the school board's decision, the majority found that Bell's rap
qualified as the type of speech capable of regulation because a layperson
could reasonably conclude that Bell's song threatened, harassed, and in-
timidated the two coaches.38 Moreover, the majority found that because
Bell's speech fell under this new exception, the school could have reason-
ably forecast that it would cause a substantial disruption. 39 The court
even suggested that speech that threatened, harassed, or intimidated a
teacher might always satisfy Tinker as a matter of law.40 The majority
bolstered its opinion with the policy of giving school officials the ability to
prevent school violence, especially with the increased number of school
shootings. 41 Lastly, the court stressed that speech like Bell's "disrupts, if
not destroys, the very mission for which schools exist-to educate." 42
Four judges dissented, concluding that the majority misapplied Tinker
and created a broad exception that violated Bell's First Amendment
rights.43 One dissent stressed how the majority failed to recognize that
Bell's song qualified as speech on a matter of public concern, meaning
that the First Amendment afforded it special protection.44 In addition,
the majority's exception did not give students, parents, or school adminis-
trators adequate notice of what off-campus speech might cause a disrup-
32. Bell 11, 799 F.3d at 396.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 394.
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id. (emphasis added); cf. Kowalski v. Berkley Cty. Schs. 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir.
2011); Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2007).
37. Bell II, 799 F.3d at 397.
38. Id. at 396-97.
39. Id. at 398-99.
40. Id. at 397.
41. Id. at 399.
42. Id. at 400.
43. See id. at 404, 434-35 (Dennis, Prado, Haynes, & Graves, JJ., dissenting).
44. See id. at 404 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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tion.45 Other dissents recognized the need for guidance from the
Supreme Court and the broad reach of the majority's ruling.46 One judge
even called for a modified "Tinker-Bell standard" to apply to off-campus
student speech. 47
While valid policy justifications influence the Fifth Circuit's en banc
decision to regulate Bell's song, the court's opinion incorrectly applies
Tinker, and misses the opportunity to clarify the law for off-campus on-
line student speech, instead creating more confusion over when certain
student speech may be subject to discipline. 48 The Fifth Circuit's initial
starting point misses the mark. Instead of beginning with the presumption
that school officials' ability to regulate student speech may be limited, the
majority should have started with the presumption that students are "en-
titled to 'significant' First Amendment rights."'49 Thus, by positioning it-
self from the point of view of the school instead of from the student, the
court sets itself up to improperly apply Tinker to Bell's speech. And al-
though the majority follows some sister circuits by applying Tinker to
Bell's rap song, Tinker's historical context suggests that the case was not
meant to apply to off-campus online speech.50 Instead, "Tinker's holding
is expressly grounded in the 'special characteristics of the school environ-
ment,"'51 which is notably absent in Bell's case. Thus, it is inappropriate
to apply Tinker to speech that inherently lacks those special educational
qualities. 52
However, the Internet has changed the way students communicate with
each other and with their schools, meaning that the law must also adapt.53
In addition, courts must give great weight to the threats posed by poten-
tial school shootings and give school officials the ability to prevent such
violence. 54 When off-campus online student speech does not fit within the
narrow exceptions consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the circuit
courts are not equipped with a sufficient alternative to Tinker.55 Thus,
while Tinker was not meant to apply to off-campus student speech, the
combination of the Internet, the threat of school violence, and the silence
45. See id. at 418.
46. See id. at 433, 435 (Prado, Haynes, & Graves, JJ., dissenting).
47. Id. at 435-36 (Graves, J., dissenting) (combining Tinker's substantial disruption
test with a sufficient nexus test).
48. See id. at 411, 417 (Dennis, J. dissenting).
49. Id. at 415 (quoting Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735-36
(2011)).
50. Bell 1, 774 F.3d at 293-94.
51. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 937 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Smith,
J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Tinker v. Des. Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
52. See Bell 11, 799 F.3d at 435 (Graves, J. dissenting); J.S., 650 F.3d at 938.
53. See David J. Fryman, Note, When the Schoolhouse Gate Extends Online: Student
Free Speech in the Internet Age, 19 FORDHAM INTLL. PROP. MEADIA & ENr. L.J. 557,
571-72 (2009).
54. See Bell IH, 799 F.3d at 396; 165 School Shootings in America Since 2013, EVFR-
YTOWN iOR GUN SAFETY SUPPOR'T FUND, Dec. 27, 2015, http://every.tw/l LL3P6X [https://
perma.cc/X4FZ-MSMP].
55. See supra notes 25 and 28.
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from the Supreme Court, make Tinker an attractive test for the Fifth Cir-
cuit-and some of its sister circuits-to apply when faced with certain off-
campus online student speech like Bell's. 56 But it does not follow that
Tinker must apply to off-campus speech; because the speaker is a student,
Tinker is not automatically implicated.57 Instead, some judges have sug-
gested that traditional First Amendment principles offer the proper anal-
ysis for off-campus online student speech.58 Others have complained that
because First Amendment doctrine "developed from restrictions on other
media" it is ill-equipped to apply to student speech. 5 9 However, until the
Supreme Court provides more guidance for off-campus online student
speech, the trend of misapplying Tinker will likely continue in the circuit
courts, as evidenced by Bell H.
Even if Tinker provides the proper test for evaluating off-campus on-
line student speech, the Fifth Circuit created a broad and vague exception
that is inconsistent with its own past precedent and the Supreme
Court's. 60 This exception grants a school wide discretion to regulate off-
campus online student speech that targets a school and that a layperson
would understand to be threatening, harassing, or intimidating. 6 1 While
the majority claims this standard is not "rigid," it instead creates a test
that is too flexible, making it too vague for practical application. 62 As-
suming a layperson is equivalent to what is known as law's "reasonable
man,"63 the majority's opinion "fails to apprehend that reasonable minds
may differ about when speech qualifies as 'threatening,' 'harassing,' or
'intimidating."' 64 The facts of the Bell case serve to highlight the excep-
tion's ambiguity-while one of the coaches said the rap made him feel
"'scared,"' the other testified that the song was "'just a rap,'" nothing to
be threatened by.6 5 The majority's exception is not only vague, but also
broad because it fails to account for both the speech as a whole and its
context.66 Taken in its entirety, Bell's song qualifies as rap music where
the use of violent language is prevalent. 67 However, the court's standard
for threatening, harassing, or intimidating speech does not account for an
analysis of the speech in its entirety, making it too broad "for the First
Amendment to tolerate. '68 Also, off-campus speech inherently occurs
away from the educational context that grounds the Supreme Court's ex-
56. See supra note 28.
57. See Bell H, 799 F.3d at 425 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 404; J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (Smith, J., concurring).
59. Bell 11, 799 F.3d at 433 (Prado, J. dissenting).
60. Cf supra notes 25 and 28.
61. See Bell II, 799 F.3d at 396 (majority opinion).
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., RESIATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
64. Bell 1H, 799 F.3d at 418 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 388, 429.
66. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011).
67. Bell I, 774 F.3d at 301.
68. See Bell II, 799 F.3d at 396, 417.
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ceptions for regulation of student speech. 69 Without including a contex-
tual analysis, the majority's exception will likely have broad practical
implications because it will regulate protected speech, chilling student
speech overall.70
In addition to creating this vague and broad exception, the majority
expressly refused to adopt or reject another circuit's approach to off-cam-
pus online student speech. 71 By deciding not to clarify the law, the major-
ity foolishly chose not to consider the reasoning of sister circuits that have
already faced the difficult issue of regulating off-campus online student
speech.72 Instead, the Fifth Circuit adds yet another test to the tangle of
case law applied to off-campus online student speech. 73 The court's re-
fusal to evaluate its sister circuits' reasoning means that students, parents,
and schools will not have "constitutionally adequate notice of when stu-
dent speech crosses the line between permissible and punishable off-cam-
pus expression.' 74
Despite the need for clarity, the Fifth Circuit's Bell H decision misap-
plies Tinker and creates even more ambiguity with its vague exception. 75
The holding fosters both inconsistency among courts' analysis and inade-
quate notice for when student speech may be regulated.76 While both the
Internet and the prevalence of school violence legitimately support the
majority's holding, the court's final decision suggests that the time has
come for the Supreme Court to review and clarify Tinker's application to
this new breed of student speech.7
7
69. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
70. See Bell 11, 799 F.3d at 419; cf Bell 1, 774 F.3d at 302.
71. See Bell H, 799 F.3d at 396.
72. See id.; cf. supra note 28.
73. See supra notes 25 and 28.
74. See Bell H, 799 F.3d at 405-06 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 396 (majority opinion).
76. See id. at 405 (Dennis, J., dissenting); cf supra note 28.
77. See Bell II, 799 F.3d at 399, 433 (Prado, J., dissenting). Ultimately the Court de-
clined to hear Bell's case. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, No. 15-666, 2016 WL 763687, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 29, 2016) (mem.).
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